We consider non zero sovereign and private default probabilities in a monetary, open economy, search and matching model to allow the emergence of a sovereign risk channel and to test whether this …nancial wedge can reverse the sign of the Keynesian …scal multiplier, conditional to alternative …scal consolidation measures. The model is estimated with Bayesian techniques using data of EZ peripheral countries (Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain). From posterior simulations we show that the relation between sovereign risk and macroeconomic fundamentals is weak. Moreover, …scal contractions are self-defeating, such that the sovereign risk channel ampli…es the e¤ects of the …scal contraction. The consideration of a liquidity trap environment does not reverse, and reinforces, these results. 
Introduction
A number of advanced economies, following the global …nancial crisis, exprienced increases in sovereign debt that were unrecedented during peacetime. Such an evolution, which is still ongoing, has been particularly worrying in the periphery of the euro-zone. Even if di¤erent factors are likely to have played a role, the early stages of the sovereign debt surge were characterized by strong uncertainty about sovereign debt sustainability in all the peripheral countries, leading to rising bond and credit rates that worsened the stressed public and private …nances. As an immediate result, debt reduction and …scal consolidation became the major declared goals of European policymakers. Concerns about the risks of contagion (Guerrieri et al. 2012 ) led governments and European institutions to to set-up coordinated measures targeted to gain control over strained public budgets, i.e. to debt reduction and …scal consolidation.
Despite the general acknowledgement of the fact that, historically, a number of alternative and not mutually exclusive factors played a role in successful debt reductions (Reinart and Sbrancia, 2011) 2 , the recently signed Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance ("…scal compact"), to be rati…ed in national parliaments by the end of 2013, establishes a set of policy measures that are -to a large extent -rooted in the automatic implementation of austerity plans in the case of structural de…cits. These …scal arrangements, backed by the hypothesis of expansionary …scal contractions (Giavazzi and Pagano, 1990; 1996; Alesina and Perotti, 1997;  Alesina and Ardagna, 2010), miss a widespread scienti…c consensus about their actual e¤ectiveness (Romer and Romer, 2010; Guajardo et. al., 2011; Ramey, 2011) , but continue to receive large interest in macroeconomic research.
The hypothesis of a sovereign risk channel, suggested by the observation of a strong correlation between government bond and private sector spreads (Harjes, 2011) , has recently provided further support to the idea of expansionary austerity, aside from the concepts of Ricardian equivalence and crowding-out e¤ects of private expenditure.
From the theoretical perspective, Corsetti et al. (2013) show that, by modelling the sovereign default risk as an increasing function of the debt level, and considering a spillover e¤ect from government bond rates to the private sector's credit conditions, …scal contractions lead to a reduction of the government expenditure …scal multiplier. For high levels of public debt and when the economy operates in a liquidity-trap environment, the sign of the multiplier can even be reversed, giving rise to expansionary …scal contractions. A …scal contraction, by reducing the level of debt, leads to a reduction in the sovereign default risk, which is translated into reduced bond and lending rates to the private sector. The improved credit conditions, i.e. reduced real interest rates, may stimulate an economic expansion.
The consideration of a sovereign risk channel can thus overturn the results of a recent literature showing that the interaction between …scal and monetary policy regimes is crucial for the e¢ cacy of the …scal stimulus, particularly in a liquidity-trap Eggertsson and Krugman, 2012) .
According to this literature, if the monetary authority is constrained by a binding zero-lower-bound (ZLB), …scal contractions -because of their de ‡ationary implications -induce a rise in the real interest rate of the same size of the de ‡ation, leading to a strong economic contraction.
In this paper we develop a monetary model to evaluate the empirical validity of the sovereign risk channel hypothesis and of the related hypotesis of expansionary …scal contractions. We calculate and compare the country-speci…c dynamic multipliers of …nancially equivalent …scal policies a¤ecting government consumption, transfers and investments on the expenditure side, and direct and indirect consumption taxes on the revenue side. The monetary model is estimated with Bayesian techniques on a large set of data for …ve major EZ peripheral countries, i.e. Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain (the PIIGS). Policy simulations consider both a standard environment in which the domestic economies operate at their full potential and a non standard liquidity-trap environment, with a binding ZLB.
The model is characterized by the joint consideration, in an otherwise standard closed-economy monetary model with nominal and real imperfections (Christiano et al., 2005; Smets and Wouters, 2007) , of some theoretical extensions that are functional to the analysis.
The design of the monopolistically competitive …nancial sector (Curdia and Woodford, 2010) , in which we assume costly Rotemberg pricing and non zero default probabilities on the side of both private and public borrowers, is key for the emergence of the sovereign risk channel. On this respect, we follow the strategy adopted by Corsetti et al. (2013) by formalizing a relation between sovereign default probability and interest rate spreads without providing an explicit model of the default event. However, we also substantially depart from their formal setting by assuming a di¤erent shape of the cumulative distribution function for the sovereign default probability, partly di¤erent economic fundamentals, by considering both the debt and the net foreign asset to GDP ratios as arguments of the default probability function, and by explicitly formalizing a private sector default probability. The choice of considering the debt to GDP ratio in the place of the debt level has two major justi…cations: on the one hand, it ensures consistency with the empirical literature, addressing economic growth and the ability of the government to service its debt as fundamental triggers of the default risk (Levy-Yeyati and Panizza 2011; Mendoza and Yue, 2012; De Grauwe and Ji, 2013) ; on the other hand, it highlights the close link between the size of the …scal multipliers and the sign of the sovereign risk channel e¤ects. In fact, when the former are su¢ ciently high, the debt to GDP ratio can increase following a …scal contraction, leading to further de ‡ationary pressure through increased bond and lending rate spreads. The consideration of the net foreign assets position as an important trigger of sovereign default risk is common in the empirical literature (Edwards, 1986; De Grauwe and Ji, 2013) . Default episodes are in fact often preceded by large imbalances in the foreign asset position. A …scal retrenchment, by improving the foreign position through reduced imports, is likely to mitigate the …nancial pressure of international lenders.
The consideration of a search and matching labor market framework (Diamond, 1982; Mortensen and Pissarides, 1994; Pissarides, 2000) with staggered Nash-wage bargaining (Gertler et al., 2008; Gertler and Trigari, 2009) , allows the evaluation of the unemployment implications of the alternative …scal policies. The formalization of an optimal rule for government investment expenditure decisions ensures that the production potential is optimized. The small open economy framework, developed along the lines of Adolfson et al. (2007; and Christiano et al. (2011) , in which the foreign sector is described by a structural vector auto-regressive system (SVAR), allows the evaluation of the e¤ects of the policies on the net foreign position.
Results show that the default risk channel is only marginally e¤ective, since the estimated relation between fundamentals and spreads is weak and, most importantly, it operates in the opposite direction than predicted.
The reason for the latter result is that, irrespective of the …scal instrument being considered, the …scal contraction leads to an increase of the debt to GDP ratio, triggering a rise in default probabilities and interest rate spreads, whilst the improvement in the NFA position to GDP ratio, stimulating a reduction in default probabilities and spreads, is not su¢ cient to counterbalance the former e¤ect.
The analysis also shows that two key factors are responsible for such result: First the low estimated elasticities of the default probability to the debt to GDP and NFA position ratios lead to very small variations in bond and lending rates; ii) the relatively high size of the …scal multipliers implies that a decrease in the debt to GDP ratio is never observed following a …scal contraction, ruling out even trascurable reductions in the interest rates.
The consideration of a deep recession characterized by a binding ZLB highlights the role played by the monetary policy regime. Results show that, in this situation, the e¤ ectiveness of policies based on reduced marginal costs and internal de ‡ations is weakened and delayed, because of the impossibility of accommodating the de ‡ation with a relevant nominal interest rate drop. Such a result holds both for the labor market targeted …scal policies (hiring and wage subsidies for new hires of labor) and for …scal expansions based on tax cuts.
On the contrary, and in line with the results of a recent literature Eggertsson and Krugman, 2012) , the e¢ cacy of standard in ‡ationary …scal measures, as are the policies based on increased government expenditure, is increased by the reduced counteracting response of the monetary policy.
The paper is organized as follows: Section one describes the model, focusing in particular on the theoretical extensions implemented in the design of the labor market. Section two provides the details of the Bayesian estimation of the country-speci…c models. Here we describe the data and their transformations, we address issues of empirical identi…cation, the calibration and the elicidation of priors for the structural model and the Bayesian SVAR parameters, and discuss the posterior estimates. Section three provides a discussion of simulation results, explaining the propagation mechanics in the standard time and binding ZLB environments.
Section four concludes.
The model
We jointly consider a number of extensions to the now standard set-up of the new-Keynesian monetary model, characterized by the presence of nominal and real frictions in both goods and labor markets (Christiano et al., 2005; Smets and Wouters, 2007) . First, we introduce a monopolistically competitive …nancial sector (Curdia and Woodford, 2010) which is subject to non zero default probabilities on the side of both public and private borrowers, such that a sovereign default risk channel emerges (Corsetti et al." 2013) . Second, we consider a small open economy framework, developed along the lines of Adolfson et al. (2007; and Christiano et al. (2011) , in which the foreign sector is exogenous with respect the domestic economy and its evolution is described by a structural vector auto-regressive system (SVAR). Third, we adopt a reasonably detailed speci…cation of the …scal sector, whose relevance for macroeconomic dynamics is recuperated by considering that a fraction of households are liquidity constrained. The design of the …scal sector marginally resembles that proposed in Drautzburg and Uhlig (2011) , and considers unemployment bene…ts in addition to the standard …scal instruments characterizing the expenditure and revenues sides of …scal models, and an optimal de…nition of the public investment and capital decisions. Fourth, we develop a detailed representation of the non Walrasian labor market, basically following Diamond (1982) , Mortensen and Pissarides (1994) , and Pissarides (2000) for the introduction of hiring costs and matching frictions, and Gertler et al. (2008) and Gertler and Trigari (2009) for the representation of the staggered Nash-wage bargaining between unions and …rms.
The major novelty in the design of the monopolistically competitive …nancial sector is the consideration of a non zero default probability for both private sector and public sector borrowers, obtained by formalizing a cumulative distribution function relating the sovereign default probability to the debt and the NFA position to GDP ratios, and the private sector default probability to the sovereign default probability. Default risks are traduced in bond and lending rate spreads through the consideration of a no arbitrage condition between deposits and domestic bond holdings, and an optimality condition for credit institutions including the Loss Given Default of the bank in the case of counterparty default, respectively. 
where C r t is a composite consumption index, h e C t 1 denotes external habits c is the consumption curvature parameter and 0 n t 1 denotes the fraction of household members who are employed. t and t are two preference shocks which are assumed to follow the i.i.d. processes t = e " ;t and t =
(1 c )t n t , respectively, where n t = e " n ;t 4 .
Each household purchases consumption and investment goods by means of after tax labor and capital incomes, after tax unemployment bene…ts, dividends and government transfers. The budget constraint is thus given by:
(1 + 
where I r t is private investment, A t = etB t+1 Pt is the aggregate net foreign asset position of the domestic economy, e t is the nominal e¤ective exchange rate and
Pt denotes household's deposits to …nancial intermediaries in real terms. B r t and B t are domestic and foreign bond holdings, respectively, P t is the consumption price index and R g t = R t q b;t , R g t = R t q b;t are the domestic and foreign interest rates on government bonds, where R t , R t denote the respective policy rates and q b;t , q b;t are the home and foreign spreads on government bonds, respectively, the latter de…ned within the SVAR system for the foreign variables. The variable p d;g t and the parameter z denote the sovereign debt default probability and the recovery rate on defaulted bonds. 
where e t is a time varying shock to the risk premium, which is assumed to follow the AR(1) stochastic process e t = e e t 1 e " e ;t and e a , e s and e r are positive elasticities. Our speci…cation ensures the satisfaction of the usual equilibrium requirements (Lundvik, 1992; Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe, 2001 ) and adds some ‡exibility to alternative modi…ed UIP equations adopted in the literature (e.g. Adolfson et al. 2008 and Christiano et al. 2011 ). The log-linear representation of the modi…ed UIP is the following:
were the parameter e s de…nes the autoregressive behavior of the expected change in the nominal exchange rate and e r 0 denotes the elasticity to the interest rate di¤erential on bond holdings, allowing for the emergence of the "forward premium puzzle" (for e r > 1), i.e. the negative correlation between interest rate di¤erentials 5 The function a u k t is assumed to be strictly increasing and convex, with curvature parameter k . The utilization rate relates e¤ective to physical capital in a standard fashion, i.e. K r t (i) = K p;r t 1 (i)ut(i). 6 In order to ensure long-run balanced growth, b u t is assumed to grow at the labor augmenting productivity growth rate .
and expected exchange rate variations often observed in empirical trials 7 .
The law of motion of physical capital is described by the following equation:
where S(
) de…nes the private investment adjustment cost function, with curvature parameter i , and q i;t is an investment-speci…c shock, which is assumed to follow the i.i.d. stochastic process q i;t = e "q i ;t .
Aggregate demand for type X t goods, X t = (C t ; I t ), is obtained as a CES index of domestically produced and imported goods, such that:
where, from households'cost minimization, X 
From the …rst order condition (F.O.C.) for consumption, the following consumption Euler equation is obtained:
1.1.2 The rule-of-thumb household Liquidity constrained and unconstrained households have the same number of workers:
From the budget constraint of the liquidity constrained household the following consumption equation is obtained:
where it is evident that rule-of-thumbers spend all their net income (from labor, government transfers and unemployment bene…ts) in consumption goods. 
where K g t is public capital, and are the private and public capital shares in production, respectively, and a t = a a t 1 e " a ;t is an AR(1) process de…ning the evolution of total factor productivity.
The optimizing …rm chooses the optimal quantity of capital by solving the following maximization problem: (10) whose re-arranged F.O.C. yields: 
is the e¤ective interest rate. p dp t (i) denotes the …rm's default probability and d
is the cost of default per unit of borrowed cost of labor.
Final sector: wholesalers and retailers in the domestic, import and export sectors
For expositional convenience, a joint description of the structure of the …nal good sector, composed of domestic, import and export wholesalers and retailers, is provided. We consider a variable demand elasticity in the three sectors, indexed by k = (d; m; x), by assuming a ‡exible variety aggregator à la Kimball (1995) :
such that the domestic retailers demand function for di¤erentiated goods is:
where:
The optimization problem of wholesalers …rms that are allowed to re-optimize their prices reads: 
where
;t , and the aggregate domestic price indexes read: 
, purchased by the intermediate good producer …rms at the interest rate R l t for anticipated wage payments W t n t .The term l p;t+j represents the stochastic loan demand elasticity in the credit sector, which is assumed to follow the AR(1) stochastic process
Intertemporal cost minimization implies that the optimal loan demand is given by
At the end of each period, the monopolistically competitive bank pays back the interest-augmented initial deposits R t D t (i) and ownership pro…ts to households. The representative monopolistically competitive bank maximizes its pro…t function facing Rotemberg-type costs for adjusting the interest rate on loans:
subject to the credit balance sheet constraint:
where IB t (i), Q t (i) = q D t (i) and q denote interbank borrowing, the bank amount and the bank ratio of reserves respectively, and b in (16) denotes the Rotemberg adjustment cost parameter.
The observed strong co-movement between government bond and lending rates indicates that the market valuation of sovereign debt assets a¤ects the private sector credit conditions 9 . In order to capture this relation, we assume a non zero default probability in the private sector, described by the following cumulative density function:
where ' s;p and s;p are the scale and the shape parameters of the private sector default c.d.f., respectively, such that:
Equation (17) expresses to which degree the probability of default of sovereign debt p Note that, compared to the formulation adopted in Corsetti et al. (2013) , who assume a direct log-linear relation between government and credit rate spreads, we model the underlying relation between the sovereign debt and private sector default probabilities.
From the optimality condition of the monopolistically competitive bank, the following lending rate equation is obtained:
where z p is the share of the Gordon's …rm value
determining the Loss Given Default (LGD) 1 z p z t of the bank in the case of counterparty default 10 . The above expression highlights that, in our setting, the lending rate is determined by the risk free rate, the markup and the cost of adjusting the interest rate as in the standard literature considering imperfect credit markets (Curdia and Woodford, 2010; Gerali et al., 2010) , as well as by the survival rate of the private sector …rms and the LGD. Manasse and Roubini, 2009; De Grauwe and Ji 2013): i) the government debt to GDP ratio B t =Y t and ii) the NFA position to GDP ratio A t =Y t . Our preferred speci…cation for the sovereign default probability is de…ned by the cumulative distribution function:
The sovereign default risk
such that,
@At < 0 and:
where A t is the net foreign indebtedness.
From the optimality condition for deposits and domestic bond holdings, and since R g t = R t q b t , the following 1 0 Instead of considering the standard Gordon's …rm value model, we consider the value of the entire production and supply chain, that is, the value of the intermediate and …nal sector …rm. no arbitrage condition must hold:
is the recovery rate on government bond in the case of sovereign debt default. The parameters i and i denote the domestic and foreign contribution to a hypothetical international insurance institution (e.g. the IMF) and z is the e¢ ciency parameter de…ning the relation between contribution and insurance coverage (e.g. the quota of SDRs to the IMF).
Given the positions above and considering the no arbitrage condition (20), the interest rate spread on government bonds reads:
where the government bond premium q b t emerges as a result of a non zero probability p
Note that, aside from the consideration of the net foreign assets position, our preferred speci…cation of the sovereign default risk depart from the one adopted in Corsetti et al. (2013) in two main respects: …rst, we do not consider a …scal limit, i.e. an upper bound for the debt to GDP ratio, on the grounds that such a limit is neither theoretically nor empirically identi…able. Second, in line with the empirical literature, we consider the debt to GDP ratio in the place of the debt level, in order to take into account the crucial role of the GDP dynamics in the de…nition of the sovereign default risk addressed in the literature (Levy-Yeyati and Panizza 2011; Mendoza and Yue, 2012), relate the analysis more closely to the available empirical literature, addressing the debt to GDP ratio as a fundamental measure of the capacity of the government to service its debt, and consider the evolution of the NFA position to GDP ratio as an additional trigger of sovereign the default probability (Edwards, 1986; De Grauwe and Ji, 2013) . Note also that the consideration of the debt to GDP ratio implies that the size and the sign of the default risk channel crucially depends on the size of the …scal multipliers. When …scal multipliers are large, …scal contractions can lead to transitory but persistent increases in the debt to GDP ratio, activating a default risk channel operating in an opposite -pro-cyclicaldirection than predicted.
Figure 1 depicts, for di¤erent levels of the debt to GDP ratio and of the sensitivity parameter b , the behavior of the default probability function (panel a) and of the government bond spread (panel b), considering a parameterization which is consistent with the data of the …ve economies in the analysis. The shape parameter s;g is …xed to a value of 20, whilst the scale parameter ' s;g is …xed such that, given an elasticity coe¢ cient b = 0:5, the observed intersections between the debt to GDP ratio and the government bond spread for each country belong to the default probability surface. FIGURE 1 about here
The labor market
The matching process is described by a standard Cobb-Douglas matching technology:
where m is the matching e¢ ciency parameter, t is the number of vacancies and u t = 1 n t 1 denotes the unemployment rate once the labor force stock has been normalized to one. The chosen timing in the unemployment relation shows that individuals entering the labor force stock activate their job search immediately, whilst workers that loss their job in t are not able to search for a new one in the same period of the separation event. Given the job …lling rate q t = m t = t and the job …nding rate s t = m t =u t , the labor market tightness can equivalently be de…ned as t = t =u t or t = s t =q t .
Under the assumption of exogenous separation, the employment law of motion is described by the following dynamic equation
where is the separation rate.
Workers value functions
Let W t (w t ) be the worker value of being matched to a job evaluated at the wage w t and U t be the value of being unemployed at time t. The value of the employment/unemployment states are the following:
where w is the Calvo parameter de…ning the probability of being unable to re-optimize the wage in t + 1, t is the Lagrange multiplier and w t is the re-optimized wage. From equations (24) and (25) the net value of being employed, i.e. the worker'surplus W t (w t ) U t , is obtained.
Firms value functions
Let J t (w t ) be the asset value of a job evaluated at the wage w t :
Given the value of a vacancy:
and imposing the free entry condition, J v t = 0, the vacancy posting condition is obtained
Nash wage bargaining
Given the the worker'surplus W t (w t ) U t , the …rm's asset value of a job J t (w t ) and the union's bargaining power &, the Nash-bargaining solution is given by &(1
Plugging the value functions in the latter equation, the optimal real wage reads:
1.5 Government policies
The monetary authority
The Central Bank sets the nominal interest rate R t 1 + r t according to a contemporaneous rule considering in ‡ation, output and output growth deviations from the respective steady state values. The policy instrument is adjusted gradually, giving rise to interest rate smoothing:
where R de…nes the degree of interest rate smoothing, 1 and 2 are the feedback coe¢ cients to CPI in ‡ation t 11 , and output growth, respectively. The stochastic term r t denotes the monetary policy shock, which is assumed to be white noise The fact that the countries being considered in this study all joined a common currency and a centralized monetary policy since 1999 (2001 for Greece) implies that, at the estimation stage, a regime break has to be taken into account. To implement such a structural break, we will consider a permanent observed exogenous shock acting as a multiplicative regime-shift dummy variable on all the three monetary policy coe¢ cients.
The …scal authority
By expressing government consumption, government transfers, hiring subsidies and unemployment bene…ts in terms of domestic goods, the government budget constraint in real terms reads:
e "tr;t are the partial adjustment stochastic processes for government expenditures for consumption and transfers, respectively, with D t denoting the government …nancial need, and " g;t , " tr;t i.i.d.
shocks.
The government …nancial need D t is the following:
A fraction of D t is …nanced with distortionary taxation on consumption, labor income, capital and on business pro…ts, such that:
whilst the remaining fraction is …nanced by issuing government bonds:
We assume that the di¤erent tax rates are partially adjusted by choosing the vector of government tax
where i t , i = c; n; k; p, denotes the systematic component on the revenue side, which relates to the stochastic tax rate considering a …rst order autoregressive stochastic wedge i t denoting the discretionary component, such that
An optimal rule is considered for government investment expenditures. The …scal authority is assumed to choose the public capital stock K g t and public investment I g t by maximizing the distance between output Y t and the …nancial need, i.e.:
(1 )
where g is the public capital depreciation rate and S g (
) denotes the government investment adjustment cost function, with curvature parameter ig . The …rst order conditions for government capital and investment are, respectively:
is the shadow price of government capital and q
t 1 e " i g ;t is a stochastic process for the government investment-speci…c shock.
Model closure
Given the presence of intertemporally optimizing households j 2 [0; 1 h ] and of rule-of-thumb households j 2 (1 h ; 1], aggregate consumption and government transfers are given by:
and
where, given d = T R nr t =T R r t , the fraction of government transfers to Ricardian and non Ricardian households are, respectively:
.
Since only Ricardian households hold bonds and accumulate capital, aggregate variables are related to the vector of Ricardian-speci…c variables as follows:
Market clearing for the foreign bond market and the …nal goods market requires that at the equilibrium the following two equations for net foreign assets evolution and aggregate resources are satis…ed:
and:
Y t are total exports, with denoting the foreign demand elasticity parameter 13 .
The stationary representation of the model is obtained by scaling the real variables with respect to the trending technology process. The scaled model is then log-linearized around the deterministic steady state, taking into account that the presence of a deterministic term in the productivity growth process a¤ects the coe¢ cients of the dynamic equations.
The resulting log-linearized model is composed of 55 structural equations and of 22 shock processes, of which eight are assumed to be …rst order autoregressive and the remaining 14 are assumed to be i.i.d.. The economic relations are described by 67 structural parameters (including the …scal and monetary policy rules coe¢ cients), whilst the stochastic component of the model is de…ned by 30 coe¢ cients (22 for the standard deviations of shocks and eight for the autoregressive coe¢ cients) 14 .
The foreign economy
Foreign output (y t ), in ‡ation ( t ), short and long-term interest rates r s;t and r b;t , respectively are exogenous to the variables of the small domestic economy and their evolution is described by a fourth-order 1 3 At the estimation stage we will also consider an additive stochastic process % t in the aggregate resources constraint, i.e. a …rst order autoregressive measurement error % t = % % t 1 e " %;t . Such a shock is generally considered in the empirical literature in order to enhance the estimates when these include output and all its components appearing in the model. 1 4 We denote as structural parameters those de…ning preferences, technology, elasticities, real and nominal rigidities in the good and labor markets, as well as the coe¢ cients describing the monetary and …scal policy reaction rules. The seven autoregressive coe¢ cients are those describing the memory of the technology process around the deterministic trend, of the structural shock on government investments, on exports, the home bias, the uncovered interest parity, the long-term interest rate spread and the memory of a measurement error included in the aggregate constraint. , BB 0 =
The assumptions on the contemporaneous correlations matrix B are consistent with the hypothesis that output and in ‡ation do not respond contemporaneously to the other shocks in the system (Adolfson et al., 2008) 15 ,
and that the 10-years government bond rate is post-recursive with respect to the short-term interest rate.
The SVAR system adds four linear stochastic equations to the economic and stochastic relations of the domestic economy model, resulting in a total of 81 equations and 26 shocks.
Bayesian estimation
The rich parameterization of the model precludes the estimation of the entire parameter space, because of the poor empirical identi…ability of medium and large scale DSGE models (Canova and Sala, 2009; Iskrev, 2010a,b; Koop et al., 2011) . Even if log-linearized around the deterministic steady state, these structures are in fact characterized by relevant nonlinearities in parameter convolutions, such that the likelihood generated by the model can be uninformative, i.e. multimodal or ‡at with respect to some parameter values. On these premises, only the subset of the parameter space that satis…es the theoretical and empirical identi…cation conditions is estimated using the Bayesian method, whilst for the remaining subset we adopt dogmatic priors speci…ed according to the available country-speci…c evidence and to conventional calibration values.
A Bayesian approach is adopted also for the estimation of the foreign variables SVAR, in this case considering a partially modi…ed Minnesota priors speci…cation approach. The choice of using the Bayesian method for the estimation of the SVAR is based on recent results showing its good properties both within sample and in terms of minimization of the predictive variance of the resulting model (Banbura et al., 2010) .
Data issues and measurement equations
To enhance the empirical identi…cation of the widest fraction of the structural parameters space, we use a large set of domestic and foreign quarterly variables to estimate the country-speci…c models. Considering the variables for the foreign sector, the log di¤erence of real output y Before linking the observed variables to the theoretical counterparts, some of the latter are transformed in order to get full consistency with the statistical de…nitions. In particular, the transformations take into account that, di¤erently from the statistical aggregates, consumption and investment in the theoretical model are composites of domestic and imported goods and output also includes the hiring cost and that related to changes in the capital utilization rate.
Further transformations are needed in order to make the data consistent with the theoretical steady states and in particular with the model property of balanced growth ( ), a theoretical prediction which is not supported by the evidence in all the countries being considered, in particular for export and import shares.
1 6 Per capita variables are obtained considering the labor force as the normalizing variable. 1 7 To the best of our knowledge, the use of such a high number of observables in the estimates is unprecedented in the literature on empirical DSGE models.
1 8 Because of the lack of quarterly time series prior to 1990 for Ireland and to 2000 for Greece, quadratic interpolation methods are applied to yearly observations to obtain the quarterly …gures 1980: 1-1989:4 and 1980:1-1999:4 for Ireland and Greece, respectively. 1 9 Even in this case, since quarterly data are available only after 1999:1, adjustments to changing de…nitions and quadratic interpolation methods are applied to yearly observations in order to obtain the quarterly frequency for the preceding time span. A detailed description of the data manipulation is provided in a technical appendix of the paper, available upon request from the authors More speci…cally, the positive/negative excess trends in real variables are removed by considering sample deviations from the steady state output growth rate in the measurement equations of all the real variables in the system, such that the theory-consistent stationary great ratios are restored.
Formally, considering the vector of real per capita variables x 0 t = (c t , i t , m t , x t , w t , g t , i g t , tr t , y t ), of tax rates from the real per capita GDP growth rate, . , log , , q b , q d;p and s denote the (steady state) tax rates, the domestic and foreign real interest rates, the in ‡ation rates, the domestic and foreign government bond rate spreads, the lending rate default probability and the nominal e¤ective exchange rate, respectively, and u denotes the steady state unemployment rate.
Calibrated parameters
Calibrated values are chosen taking into account both sample and extraneous evidence when informative for the theoretical parameters, and conventional values when such information is missing.
We impose 29 dogmatic priors on the 67-dimensional structural parameters space. Absent country-speci…c information, 17 structural parameters are …xed to common values across countries. The remaining 12 dogmatic priors for structural parameters are …xed considering country-speci…c evidence.
These are the trend growth parameter , …xed considering the sample growth rate of per capita GDP, the discount factor , calibrated considering the country-speci…c trend growth and the average real interest rate, the home bias parameter (1 ), …xed according to the country-speci…c sample evidence on import shares, the separation rate , …xed to the country estimates provided by Hobijn and Sahin (2009) , the parameter de…ning the frequency of wage re-optimization w , …xed to the country estimates provided in Druant et al. (2012) , and the parameter de…ning the unemployment bene…t b u , …xed according to the country-speci…c replacement rates provided in the OECD-LFS data base (Christo¤el et al., 2009) . The private capital share , the matching e¢ ciency parameter m and the labor disutility scale parameter are calibrated such that the labor share, the unemployment rate and the job …nding rate steady-state values evaluated at the prior parameterization match the sample counterparts for each country 23 . Considering the country-speci…c dogmatic priors for the …nancial sector parameters, the contribution to the IMF parameter i is set according to the country SDR quota (in Euro) to GDP ratios, whilst the international insurance e¢ ciency parameters z is …xed such that the debt repayment rate parameter z g in (20) matches the country-speci…c sample SDR quota. The countryspeci…c scale parameter of the government default probability function ' s;g is …xed in the following manner:
given the country-speci…c z g parameter and the sample government bond rate di¤erential q b (evaluated with respect to the short-term interest rate), the country-speci…c government default probability p d;g is obtained from equation (21). The latter univocally determines the country-speci…c scale parameter ' s;g from (19), given the common shape parameter s;g , the sample debt to GDP ratio and a prior value for the government default probability b .
Finally, the coe¢ cients in the system of measurement equations (43), i.e. those in the vector of deviations from GDP trend xy , in the vectors of tax rates , of in ‡ation rates , of domestic and foreign real interest rates and bond rate spreads, log and q b , respectively, and the long-run nominal e¤ective exchange rate e, frequencies of price changes in terms of frequencies of price re-optimizations.
are …xed to the respective sample means. 
Priors for estimated parameters
The subset of (38) structural model parameters who is not a¤ected by evident identi…cation problems, the 34 coe¢ cients de…ning the stochastic component (30 for the domestic economy model and 4 for the foreign SVAR) and the 73 coe¢ cients of the SVAR system (nine for the elements of the B matrix and 64 for the vector autoregressive component) are estimated with the Bayesian method 24 .
Outside the Calvo price parameters, the prior distributions are common across countries and are speci…ed following the standard practice: i) the shape of the probability density functions is the gamma and the inverted gamma for parameters theoretically de…ned over the R + range, the beta for parameters de…ned in a
[0 1] range and the normal for priors on parameters theoretically de…ned over the R range; ii) prior means and standard deviations are de…ned on the basis of sample information (when available), or considering the results of previous analyses 25 . In order to enhance the estimation of parameters subject to weak empirical identi…ability, informative priors are adopted such that a certain degree of curvature in the log-kernel is obtained.
The prior means for the Calvo parameters of the domestic, import and export sectors, ( Considering the …nancial sector parameters de…ning the government and private sector default probabilities and interest rate spreads, a gamma-distributed prior with mean 0:5 and s.d. 0:25 is adopted for the sensitivity coe¢ cients b and a (to the debt and net foreign assets to GDP ratios, respectively), and the shape parameter for the private sector default probability function s;p is assumed to be normally-distributed with a prior mean very di¤use prior distributions adopted for these parameters re ‡ect our imprecise prior opinions, and imply that their posterior estimates will be dominated by the conditional distribution.
Concerning the monetary policy parameters, the interest rate smoothness coe¢ cient R is assumed to be beta-distributed with prior mean 0:75 and prior s.d. 0:2, the in ‡ation response parameter 1 is assumed to be normally distributed with prior mean 2 and s.d. 0:2, whilst the output growth sensitivity parameter 2 is assumed to be beta-distributed with prior mean (s.d.) of 0:25 (0:1). The three shift parameters accounting for the monetary policy structural break in the smoothness coe¢ cient and in the feedback coe¢ cients are assumed to be normally distributed with zero prior mean and s.d. equal to 0:2.
Considering the …scal policy parameters, a beta-distributed prior with mean 0:75 and s.d. 0:15 is adopted for the autoregressive components c , n , k and k in the tax rates partial adjustment equations, and g , tr in the government consumption and transfers equations, respectively. For the coe¢ cients denoting the sensitivity of these expenditure components to output, gy and try , an informative and normally distributed prior with mean 1 and s.d. 0:1 is adopted, consistent with the hypothesis of long-run balanced growth of public expenditures. A weakly informative beta-distributed prior with mean 0:05 and s.d. 0:02 is chosen for the parameters gd and trd , de…ning the sensitivity of public consumption and transfers to the government …nancial need. The latter prior is equivalent to that chosen for the sensitivity of the tax rates to the …nancial need , basically following the calibration value adopted in Drautzburg and Uhlig (2011) . Finally, a weakly informative beta-distributed prior with mean 0:25 and s.d. 0:10 is adopted for the tax instruments ! c , ! n and ! k , whilst ! p is restricted to be equal to 1
Considering the stochastic component of the models, the prior opinions for the autoregressive coe¢ cients of the seven persistent shock processes (i.e., a , i g , e , q b , % , and x ) are commonly described by a weakly informative beta-distributed prior with mean 0:75 and s.d. 0:15 28 . For the standard errors of the 26 innovations, we assume a prior mean of 0:01 with two degrees of freedom for all shocks, except those multiplying convolutions of parameters whose values are outside the 10 1 ; 10 range, that are scaled accordingly.
The prior opinions on the estimated structural parameters are summarized in the …rst column of the result Table 2 (panels a-f).
The elicidation of priors for the foreign variables' SVAR is based on the partially modi…ed Minnesota priors approach (Doan et al., 1984; Litterman, 1986; Sims and Zha, 1998) suggested by Banbura et al. where the values for the …rst-order autoregressive coe¢ cients # are obtained from the estimates of independent AR(1) processes. According to the estimated posterior mode standard deviations and the implied pseudo t-values, the structural parameter estimates, aside from # b , all appear signi…cant for each of the countries being considered.
Posterior mean estimates
2 8 The autoregressive coe¢ cients and x denote the persisitency of the stochastic component in the import and export equations, respectively. Analitically, the …rst component de…nes a stochastic home bias parameter, and the second a stochastic elasticity of substitution between foreign and domestic goods. The two stochastic components enter the log-linear representation of the model additively, such that they do not in ‡uence the empirical identi…ability of the preference parameters.
2 9 Mode checks and multivariate M-H convergence plots signal that the estimation process performs correctly for all countries. The mode estimates intersect the log posterior kernel at its maximum for all parameters. The multivariate diagnostics signal that the estimates are stable both within (over replications) and particularly between chains. Posterior densities con…rm these encouraging indications, signaling a close to normal shape and a reasonable distance from prior densities (or a more concentrated distribution), signalling that the estimated parameters are empirically identi…ed. These results are available upon request from the authors. The estimated Armington elasticity , and in particular , are generally smaller than the prior and denote a di¤erentiated pattern across countries. A similar consideration holds true for the risk premium parameter e r , which is estimated to be slightly above unit only for Spain and Italy, thus ruling out a direct emergence of the forward premium puzzle in the remaining countries.
The labor market parameters show a certain degree of variability across countries, particularly for the union's relative bargaining power parameter &, estimated to be higher than the conventional value of 0:5 for all countries except Italy (0:34). The posterior mean estimates for the hiring cost parameter and the matching function share parameter n are not distant from priors, except for the former parameter in the case of Ireland ( = 0:032).
TABLE 2b ABOUT HERE
Concerning the …nancial sector parameters, the coe¢ cient capturing the elasticity of the government default probability to the debt to GDP ratio b is estimated to be well above the prior in all countries, ranging from a minimum of 0:66 for Spain to a maximum of 1:64 for Portugal. The elasticity to the net foreign assets to GDP ratio a is on average smaller and more in line with the prior, ranging from a minimum of 0:31 for Greece to a maximum of 0:62 for Spain. The estimated shape parameter of private sector default probability function is more homogeneous across countries and on average twice the prior size. A high degree of heterogeneity is estimated for the lending rate adjustment cost parameter b , ranging from a minimum of 1:13 for Portugal to a maximum of 21:5 for Spain. An evaluation of the elasticity of the government and private sector default probabilities (thus of the government bond and lending rate spreads) to the debt and net foreign assets to GDP ratios cannot be directly obtained from these parameters. Table three reports the expected variation in the government bond and lending rate spreads consistent with a 20 percentage points temporary increase in the debt to GDP ratio and in the net foreign assets to GDP ratio in the di¤erent countries. It is interesting to note that the posterior estimates of the three shift parameters accounting for the monetary policy structural break are negative in all countries being considered, signalling that the shift to a common currency and a centralized authority targeting average EZ in ‡ation and output has implied a reduced degree of monetary policy activism with respect to the single economies'macroeconomic developments 31 .
TABLE 2d ABOUT HERE
Finally, the posterior estimates for the …scal policy coe¢ cients con…rm the high degree of inertia on both the expenditure and the revenue sides, with estimated autoregressive coe¢ cients well above the conventional calibration value of 0:9 (Perotti, 2005) . It is interesting to note that the posterior estimates for the parameter denoting the sensitivity of the tax rates to the government …nancial need , even if low and distant from the prior, are basically consistent with the Galì and Perotti (2003) estimates for OECD countries. interestingly, the estimated sensitivities of government consumption and transfers to the …nancial need ( gd and trd , respectively) are on average higher and more heterogeneous across countries, with a minimum size close to 0:01 for Ireland and a maximum size close to 0:08 for Greece. The parameter de…ning the link between longrun expenditure and output levels ( gy and try ) are always not signi…cantly di¤erent from unity, such that the hypothesis of balanced growth in the …scal variables, for the sample being considered, cannot be rejected. 
Policy simulations
In this section we provide a comparative analysis of the country-speci…c expected e¤ects from the implementation of …ve …nancially equivalent contractionary …scal policies: i) a persistent, albeit not permanent, reduction in government consumption; ii) an equally persistent reduction in government transfers; iii) a reduction in government investment; iv) a generalized increase of indirect tax rates (on labor incomes, business pro…ts and capital gains); v) an increase in the consumption tax rate. These policies are evaluated by simulating the model stochastically (thus assuming that they are unanticipated) and considering the parameterization obtained at the country-speci…c posterior mean estimates.
The di¤erent simulations are made comparable by calibrating the size of each policy shock to be equivalent to a 1% of GDP on impact and by homogenizing their persistence considering a common memory coe¢ cient of 0:75, consistent with a one year average duration of the policy shock.
By construction, each policy measure implies government budget and debt variations, thus changes in the tax rates and in the structure of public expenditure. However,in order to enhance the understanding of the simulation results, we only consider the estimated systematic components in the revenue equations, i.e., the speci…c elasticity of the tax rates to the …nancial need, whilst the expenditure side is assumed to be fully exogenous by setting the elasticities of the expenditure components to the …nancial need and to GDP to zero.
The policy simulations are performed assuming both a standard environment, i.e. one in which the monetary policy reacts to in ‡ation and output growth deviations from target according to the estimated values of the Taylor rule feedback coe¢ cients, and a recessionary environment in which the economies are operat-ing in a liquidity trap. To implement such a scenario, we calibrate a negative preference shock implying an eight-quarters period non positive equilibrium interest rate for each country, and impose the zero-lower-bound (ZLB) condition.
3.1 Government purchase and direct tax shocks: into the mechanics of the risk channel Before discussing the results of the speci…c austerity measures, it is worth providing some details on the dynamics activated by two alternative policy interventions on expenditure and revenues, i.e. a 1% GDP negative government consumption shock and a 1% GDP positive shock to direct taxes (on labor income, business pro…ts and capital gains), depicted in Figures 2 and 3 , respectively. The latter multiple shock is obtained considering that the the 1% GDP …scal contraction is obtained by incresing the speci…c tax rates according to the estimated policy instruments weights ! i , i = n; p; k.
To clarify the functioning of the transmission mechanics under the hypothesis of a default risk channel, the 20 quarters ahead impulse responses of GDP, the debt level, of the debt to GDP ratio, of the NFA evolution and of the government bond and lending rate spreads are reported. These are normalized such that the GDP response has an interpretation in terms of the dynamic monetary …scal multiplier (i.e. the expected monetary variation in GDP from a one euro budget variation), the debt to GDP ratio response depicts the deviation from its steady state in terms of GDP percentage points, and the responses of the spreads refer to annualized basic points.
FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE
Considering the government consumption contraction, a …rst outcome that merits to be highlighted is the modest variability of the output response across countries, re ‡ecting the low sensitivity of the dynamic multiplier of this measure to the heterogeneity in the estimated parameterization. This is due to the fact that government purchases a¤ect output mainly directly, inducing only second-round e¤ects on price and wage dynamics. The peak response is negative and reached on impact, and denotes a monetary multiplier ranging from values slightly above 1 for Greece, Italy and Spain, to 1:35 for Portugal and above 1:8 for Ireland. These results are fully consistent with the available average European estimates (Coenen and Straub, 2005; Forni et al., 2009) . In the standard times scenario, there are no evident signals of the operation of a sovereign debt channel, since the size of the country-speci…c multipliers are basically aligned with those obtainable from equally parameterized country models in which the default risk channel e¤ects are eliminated.
As expected, the …scal contraction leads to a reduction in the bond level in all countries, signalling that the positive response of government expenditure, due to the rise in unemployment bene…ts payments, and the negative response of revenues, due to the tax rate cuts implicit to their endogenous speci…cation, are not su¢ cient to reverse the positive e¤ects of the …scal contraction on the level of debt.
However, since the …scal contraction leads to a more than proportional decrease in output, the debt to GDP ratio temporarily increases in all the PIIGS countries, with a dynamic pattern which is substantially dominated by the negative output response. The highest increase of the debt ratio, close to 1:7% of GDP, is obtained on impact for Ireland, consistently with the negative output response; the smallest, close to 0:45% of GDP, is obtained on impact for Spain. Conditional to our model and to the estimated parameterization, …scal austerity plans implemented with government purchase cuts are thus expected to be self-defeating in the short-term.
In line with the expectations, the NFA response is positive in all countries, with evident cross-country heterogeneity. The e¤ects are stronger in Ireland and Portugal, consistent with the deeper output contraction and, in the case of Ireland, with the higher estimated elasticity coe¢ cient of imports, leading to even deeper reductions in imported goods.
The moderate but positive response of both the interest rate spreads in all countries signals that the improved NFA position relative to GDP is not enough in couterbalancing the pressure on sovereign default risk due to the increase in the debt to GDP ratio. In other terms, the size of the elasticity of default risk and thus of the bond spread to the variation in the debt to GDP ratio is high enough to dominate the counteracting e¤ects implicit in the improvement in the NFA positions.
These results signal that, conditional to a negative government consumption shock, the default risk channel operates in the opposite direction than predicted in the analysis of Corsetti et al. (2013) . Moreover, the size of the interest rate spreads response is very limited, signalling that, according to our model estimates, the default risk channel is basically irrelevant. Aside from the role played by the estimated small size of the elasticity of default risk to the macroeconomic fundamentals, the main responsible for these results is the consideration of the debt to GDP ratio in the place of the debt level, whose response to a …scal contraction is positive for su¢ ciently large …scal multipliers.
The e¤ects of a contractionary direct taxes shock are only qualitatively similar to those obtained considering a …nancially equivalent government consumption reduction. The …scal contraction has negative and persistent e¤ects on real output for all countries, even if the implicit peak multipliers are substantially smaller than those obtained with the government purchase shock, a result which is basically in line with the abundant SVARbased empirical literature on …scal multipliers since the seminal analysis of Blanchard and Perotti (2002) .
Moreover, the output dynamic multiplier is heterogeneous across countries, mainly because of the di¤erent fractions of liquidity constrained households estimated in the di¤erent countries. The fraction of rule-of-thumb households is in fact estimated to be particularly low for Greece, re ‡ecting the low correlation between private consumption and current net incomes in the sample. Considering the recent evolution of the Greek economy, it is highly probable that the fraction of liquidity contrained households increased strongly. We have veri…ed that, by including a dummy variable controlling for the recessionary periods, the estimated degree of liquidity constraints increases by nearly 18 percentage points for Greece.
Following the tax rates shock, the debt level decreases temporarily in all countries but Ireland, partly because of the higher unemployment response and the resulting increase in unemployment bene…t payments.
As a result of the debt and the GDP dynamics, a moderate but persistent surge in their ratio emerges.
Even in the case of a revenue-based …scal contraction, our results indicate that the hypothesis of expansionary …scal contractions is not empirically relevant, such that the implementation of austerity plans can be self-defeating in the short to medium term, and that the hypothesis of a sovereign risk channel, if e¤ective, operates in the opposite direction when evaluated conditional to …scal shocks.
It is interesting to note that, under the tax-based …scal contraction, the positive response of the net foreign asset position obtained in all countries is always signi…cantly larger than that obtained under the expenditurebased contraction, despite the smaller drop in economic activity. This implies that the response of imports is much stronger, a result signalling that the tax reduction induces a signi…cant variation in the relative price of the domestic production, i.e. a real exchange rate devaluation. The internal devaluation is triggered by the increased tax pressure, implying an immediate contraction of the after tax incomes and of the consumption expenditures of liquidity-constrained households. Even if the resulting decrease in labor supply tends to counterbalance the de ‡ationary pressure, the latter tends to prevail.
Concerning the e¤ects of the …scal retrenchment on the sovereign default probability on bond and lending rate spreads, the impulse responses clearly show that the contractionary tax policy, similarly to the contractionary expenditure policy, stimulates a moderate increase in the government bond and lending rate spreads.
Two key indications from the analysis of the conditional dynamics emerge: …rst, the relation between sovereign debt, net foreign position and interest rate spreads is rather weak in all the peripheral EZ economies considered in the study, such that the recent surge in government bond and lending rate premia in these countries should be mainly attributed to idiosyncratic factors only loosely related with macroeconomic fundamentals (De Grauwe and Ji, 2013) ; second, the hypotesis that -when monetary policy is unconstarined -a sovereign risk channel can mitigate the contractionary e¤ects of …scal consolidations or even -in a liquidity trap constrained regime -lead to an economic expansion, is not empiriclly supported when considering a short to medium term perspective, since …scal contractions are temporarely but persistently self-defeating, irrespective of the policy instrument being considered.
The explanation for the di¤erent results of our analysis as compared to those in Corsetti et al. (2013) relies heavily on the measure of indebtness considered in the de…nition of the default probability. The use of the debt level basically constrains the direction of change of the default probability to the one of the policy.
The use of the debt to GDP ratio, which is generally accepted as a more appropriate measure of …scal health,
does not impose such a restriction and highlights the role of the size of the …scal multipliers, determining the direction of the variation in the debt to GDP ratio and thus of the default probability.
Fiscal contractions in unconstrained and constrained monetary policy regimes
The relative e¢ cacy of alternative …scal measures in di¤erent countries depends both on the di¤erent degrees of nominal and wage rigidity and on the interaction between …scal and monetary policy regimes. In particular, an aggressive monetary policy increases the expected e¤ects of …scal measures targeted to induce a price de ‡ation through the reduction of the labor cost, and dampens those of policies stimulating the general economic activity, because of their in ‡ationary implications.
The fact that the labor market targeted …scal policies being evaluated are expected to be implemented in economies operating well below their potential, as is the case of the countries considered in this study, suggests to extend the analysis to the situation of a binding ZLB. In these circumstances, a de ‡ationary …scal policy cannot be accommodated by the automatic response of the monetary authority, since the nominal interest rate cannot be reduced further (Eggertsson et al., 2013) 32 . On the contrary, an expansionary and in ‡ationary …scal policy, until it does not succeed in taking the economy out of the liquidity trap, will not face the same counteracting e¤ects originating in the stabilizing response of the monetary policy during standard times Eggertsson and Krugman, 2012) . Tables 5 and 6 replicate, for a below potential-liquidity trap economic environment, the information on the …scal multipliers and on the employment e¤ects of the alternative policies provided by Tables 3 and 4 for the economies operating at their potential output levels. Since strongly negative output multipliers are often found, one row reporting the peak negative multiplier is added in Table 5 .
The consideration of a liquidity trap environment a¤ects the e¢ cacy of the labor market targeted …scal policies in di¤erent directions in the short and in the long term. Considering the hiring cost subsidization policy, the short-term output multipliers are signi…cantly negative in all countries but Greece, (between 0:04 for Spain and 2:6 for Portugal), whilst the long-term peak output multipliers are increased and delayed The transmission mechanics explaining these results is the same described for the simulations assuming a not binding ZLB environment. Even in this case, the subsidization policy generates a de ‡ation through the real wage contraction. The main di¤erence here is that, for the eight periods in which the ZLB binds, the monetary authority cannot accommodate the policy with a nominal interest rate reduction, such that the resulting increase in the real interest rate is of the same size of the price de ‡ation. The transitory but sizeable negative output response ampli…es the real wage contraction and the de ‡ation during the liquidity trap period.
As the economy recovers, the monetary authority decreases the policy rate by a larger amount than in a not binding ZLB environment, because of the stronger de ‡ation, and …rms are willing to hire more workers, because of the stronger real wage contraction. This justi…es the expansion following the transitory but persistent depression activated by the labor market policies.
Notwithstanding the ampli…ed and delayed long run output responses, and with the exception of Greece, the labor market targeted policies are con…rmed to be inferior to a …scal policy expansion based on government consumption. As expected, the output and employment e¤ects of …scal expansions based on government expenditures are signi…cantly increased, with the peak government consumption output multipliers in the range 1:7 3:3, and the unemployment reduction within 0:8% and 1:3%. When the ZLB binds, the counteracting response of the monetary authority does not take place until the economy is out of the liquidity trap. In this circumstance, the real interest rate tends to decrease with the increased in ‡ation, adding a positive private expenditure response to the government stimulus. It is interesting to note that, under a binding ZLB, …scal expansions based on tax rate cuts are counterproductive in all countries in the short term, and basically ine¤ective in the long run. This result is only apparently surprising. On the one hand, a labor tax cut increases the after tax current income, leading to both increased labor supply and to increased consumption demand in the fraction of liquidity constrained households. On the other, the increased labor supply induces a real wage and thus marginal cost contraction, activating a de ‡ationary pressure. Since only a minor fraction of households are liquidity constrained, the de ‡ation stimulated by the reduced tax pressure prevails such that, given the …xed policy rate, an increase in the real interest rate emerges, leading to reduced private expenditures 33 .
Conclusions
We develop, estimate and simulate a model characterized by government bond and lending rate spreads originating in the sovereign default risk triggered by internal and foreign debt positions. The consideration of an endogenous default risk channel introduces interesting elements for the conduct of …scal policy in highly indebted economies, especially when the economy is stuck at the ZLB. In principle, for increasing levels of debt and for small sized …scal multipliers, a …scal retrenchment can even be espansionary, given the induced reduction in the domestic and foreign debt positions, triggering a reduction in sovereign and private default risk and thus of the interest rate spreads.
The analysis, developed at the country-level for a selection of peripheral EZ economies (the PIIGS), is based on the simulation of the country-speci…c response of output and employment to …nancially equivalent contractionary …scal policies a¤ecting government expenditure and revenues. Results show that, contrary to some conclusions in the recent literature and the policy recommendations within the European EP and YG programmes, the labor market targeted …scal measures, in a short term perspective, are not superior to more standard …scal instruments in the management of the business cycle. The analysis also indicates that, even in a longer term perspective and aside Greece, the output multiplier of government consumption is higher than that from hiring costs and newly hired workers' subsidization. Considering the employment e¤ ects, these policies prove to be clearly superior to more standard …scal expansions only in the long term and at the Greece and Ireland model parameter estimates.
The consideration of a liquidity trap environment reinforces these conclusions, as both output and employment multipliers of government expenditures are signi…cantly increased. On the contrary -and with the exception of Greece -the output multiplier of the labor market targeted measures are strongly negative in the short term, and their peak e¤ ects are reached with an increased delay as compared with the standard environment simulations.
These results basically highlight the importance of the …scal-monetary policy coordination in the business cycle management, an option which might be out of reach during a deep recession. Notes: Impulse response of output (Yt), bond (Bt), bond to output ratio (Bt=Yt), net foreign asset (At),net foreign asset to output ratio (At=Yt), government interest rate spread (R g t Rt) and lending interest rate spread (R l t Rt) to a one percent GDP government expenditure contraction in the periphery of the eurozone obtained at the posterior mean estimate. Government and lending interest rate spreads are expressed in basis points. Notes: Impulse response of output (Yt), bond (Bt), bond to output ratio (Bt=Yt), net foreign asset (At),net foreign asset to output ratio (At=Yt), government interest rate spread (R g t Rt) and lending interest rate spread (R l t Rt) to a one percent GDP direct taxes increase, such as enterprise, capital and labor income tax increases in the periphery of the eurozone obtained at the posterior mean estimate. Government and lending interest rate spreads are expressed in basis points. Notes: In the …gure the value of the sovreign default probability and interest rate spreads on government bonds are reported.The latter is based on both sovreign default probability and …scal strain . The black line represent Ireland, the blue Greece, the cylan Spain, green Portugal and yellow Italy. For all the periphery countries …scal strain binds before default occurs. .
